2026-11-13 — Check Point PHP2Shell gateway intrusion and ESXi wiper

Threat Overview

Check Point Research published a detailed intrusion reconstruction on November 12, 2026. Attackers exploited vulnerable PHP-powered Mobile Access portals on Check Point Security Gateways (PHP2Shell CVE-2026-109618 and CVE-2026-109619), then elevated from the portal account to root through DynamicCLI IPC flaw CVE-2026-123039. Researchers observed zz*.tpl PHP webshells, a TSGA backdoor installed as slot_CPconfigdaemon, TSProxy shared library /lib/libcpfwcommon.so, internal scanning with gogo, SSH movement to VMware ESXi as vpxuser, and destroy_v6 wiper deployment with DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt notes. A first wave on October 30 targeted Israeli organizations; a November 2 wave was broader. The November 12 research adds verified post-exploitation details, not a newly disclosed PHP2Shell vulnerability.

References

Check Point Research, PHP2Shell Exploitation on Check Point Gateway (November 12, 2026): https://research.checkpoint.com/2026/php2shell-exploitation-on-check-point-gateway/

Check Point vulnerability response: PHP2Shell patch guidance (October 2026): https://research.checkpoint.com/vulnerability-response-point/

Impacted Systems

Check Point Security Gateway Mobile Access portal running vulnerable embedded PHP, particularly the observed R81.20 path /opt/CPcvpn-R81.20/tmp/; Internet-exposed Mobile Access service is the initial attack surface. PHP2Shell affects PHP 8.2–8.5 upstream branches prior to fixes 8.2.35, 8.3.36, 8.4.27 and 8.5.12, but gateway firmware/Jumbo Hotfix mapping must be obtained from Check Point; do not assume upstream PHP builds equal appliance build numbers. DynamicCLI CVE-2026-123039 is a local privilege escalation after initial access. VMware ESXi hosts reachable over SSH are downstream targets; ESXi itself is not asserted to be vulnerable to PHP2Shell. Fixed gateway builds were not established by this report.

Why this matters

The incident shows edge-device compromise progressing to root, stealthy backdoors, internal discovery and destructive ESXi activity. Customer impact includes gateway configuration theft and virtualization outages.

Exploitation Status

Check Point confirms attack attempts from October 30 and November 2 and a destructive ESXi incident. Attribution to any nation-state actor is unconfirmed; shared tooling lineage does not establish the operator identity.

What this hunt looks for

Prepared to search the relevant available Microsoft Sentinel tables for Gateway PHP crash and session anomalies, exact webshell and backdoor artifacts, outbound/SSH pivot, network scanning, and ESXi wiper notes. Prioritize the precise filenames and hashes supplied by the researchers. No customer telemetry was actually reviewed in this run.

Required logs

Each query heading identifies its required Microsoft Sentinel data source. Execute only where that data source is ingested and retained; no customer workspace execution or findings are asserted.

C01 — Known scanning infrastructure against gateway

Required telemetry: Check Point network logs normalized to CommonSecurityLog

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SourceIP in ('130.94.19.204','130.94.19.168') or DestinationIP in ('130.94.19.204','130.94.19.168')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Message
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C02 — PHP2Shell session and webshell markers in Syslog

Required telemetry: Gateway Syslog with relevant application/process events

Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ('upload_progress_pwn','zz2026','challenge_render.tpl','/tmp/.up.tpl','CPconfigdaemon','slot_CPconfigdaemon')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C03 — Gateway backdoor and wiper file artifacts

Required telemetry: Endpoint file telemetry on gateway/ESXi if available; often absent

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ('slot_CPconfigdaemon','CPconfigdaemon','libcpfwcommon.so','DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt','destroy_v6','challenge_render.tpl') or FolderPath has '/tmp/.up.tpl'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C04 — Known webshell and backdoor SHA256

Required telemetry: Endpoint file hashes from Defender for Endpoint

let Hashes = dynamic(['edb3e92eb7bda7413a09edcc4b1ba3cbed4bcdf42808a8abce63b6e4c3fda2b3','4171b521fa6441382aa2fa014a08e18ff9a6e0ab6096c9144072bf46b37a2ec8','d7549671c7189979f0624ec52dad9ea6a707d23146e3585ab8f8c4720eca0c63','3b51080a909023f7d484e2443740b572307ce0054eb9e32d98f0a06bfcd2db90','c7d9477309fac6c638a1128442056a242de086996add8cb49cd6496c36003237']);
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SHA256 in (Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, ActionType
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C05 — Gateway to ESXi SSH access

Required telemetry: Check Point network firewall logs; requires asset context to identify gateway and ESXi

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where DestinationPort == 22 and (DeviceAction =~ 'Accept' or DeviceAction =~ 'Allow' or DeviceAction =~ 'accept')
| summarize Connections=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by SourceIP, DestinationIP, DeviceName
| where Connections > 0
| order by LastSeen desc

C06 — ESXi SSH vpxuser or destructive file markers

Required telemetry: ESXi and gateway Syslog

Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ('vpxuser','DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt','destroy_v6','/tmp/des wiper','slot_CPconfigdaemon')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, ProcessName, SyslogMessage
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C07 — PHP worker crash or suspicious process events

Required telemetry: Gateway Syslog containing PHP worker crashes

Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ('segfault','segmentation fault','php-fpm','httpd')
| summarize Count=count(), Sample=take_any(SyslogMessage) by Computer, bin(TimeGenerated, 15m)
| where Count >= 10
| order by TimeGenerated desc

C08 — Suspicious internal scan from gateway

Required telemetry: Network logs; must filter SourceIP to known gateway IPs during triage

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where isnotempty(SourceIP) and isnotempty(DestinationIP)
| summarize Destinations=dcount(DestinationIP), Ports=dcount(DestinationPort), Connections=count() by SourceIP, bin(TimeGenerated, 10m)
| where Destinations >= 30 and Ports >= 5
| order by Connections desc

Detection Notes

Highest signal: upload_progress_pwn, zz*.tpl webshells, slot_CPconfigdaemon, libcpfwcommon.so, and DREAM_ANNEXATION.txt. These may not appear in network telemetry. Gateway appliance endpoint process/file telemetry is often absent; Check Point firewall logs alone cannot reveal webshell filesystem writes. ESXi Syslog can reveal SSH access or wiper activity only when ingested. An IOC IP match requires contextual validation.

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