Threat Overview
Huntress reported on November 11 that operators abused multiple ScreenConnect management panels to issue SYSTEM-level commands to endpoints. At least 288 endpoints at 48 Huntress-protected organizations were affected in approximately 90 minutes. The operator deployed a second attacker-controlled ScreenConnect client and SCKit, a 16-file package. Huntress associates activity with RMM+ extension versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepting an unset access key. ConnectWise disabled five third-party extensions across hosted partner environments. The toolkit also contains session-cookie theft and technician-to-panel propagation functionality, but Huntress had not observed that stage succeed. This is confirmed malicious activity; it is not evidence that ScreenConnect core software itself contains an unpatched flaw.
References
Huntress, SCKit worm (November 11, 2026): https://www.huntress.com/blog/sckit-worm-rogue-screenconnect
BleepingComputer, SCKit MSP campaign (November 12, 2026): https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/
Impacted Systems
ConnectWise ScreenConnect, hosted and self-hosted remote support instances; especially instances with RMM+ extension 1.0.31/1.0.32 and a blank/unset RMMPlus.AccessKey. Five disabled extension names: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link, RMM+ Password Link. Windows managed endpoints and technicians are exposed to rogue client installation and potential session theft. Reported ScreenConnect versions 26.6.6.9747 and 26.7.6.9783 occurred in affected environments, but these are not a confirmed core-product vulnerability range. No CVE or fixed RMM+ version was confirmed in the reviewed source.
Why this matters
MSP console access can propagate attacker execution across many customer endpoints. ScreenConnect command execution can run as SYSTEM, and the toolkit attempts to weaponize technician sessions.
Exploitation Status
Observed November 11–12, 2026. Huntress confirms endpoint deployment; code analysis establishes potential session-relay and lateral-spread features, but successful technician/panel hopping was not observed.
What this hunt looks for
Prepared to search the relevant available Microsoft Sentinel tables for Rogue ScreenConnect MSI installs, SCKit payloads and persistence, unusual SYSTEM shell launches, Defender exclusions, and attacker-controlled relay infrastructure. Prioritize exact SCKit file artifacts and TrapWatch persistence. No customer telemetry was actually reviewed in this run.
Required logs
Each query heading identifies its required Microsoft Sentinel data source. Execute only where that data source is ingested and retained; no customer workspace execution or findings are asserted.
S01 — Exact SCKit and RelayTrap file artifacts
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint file events
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ('Panel-Lateral.ps1','runnew.cmd','ToolboxRelayUploader.exe','Run-Lateral-Full.bat','sckit-run.bat','sckit-decoder.ps1','TrapWatch.ps1','RelayTrap.exe') or FolderPath has '\RelayTrap\'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S02 — ScreenConnect client spawning script engines or MSI
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint process events
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has 'ScreenConnect' and FileName in~ ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','msiexec.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S03 — Rogue client IDs and installer pattern
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint process events
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('2588ef5c15954b10','ed630cc2c873b091','ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi','sckit-run.bat','RelayTrap')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S04 — TrapWatch scheduled task creation
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint process events
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where (FileName =~ 'schtasks.exe' and ProcessCommandLine has 'TrapWatch') or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('RelayTrapLiteAlert','TrapWatch.ps1')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S05 — RelayTrap registry autorun
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint registry events
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where RegistryValueName =~ 'RelayTrapLiteAlert' or RegistryValueData has 'RelayTrap'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S06 — Reported relay and staging infrastructure
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint network events
let IOCs = dynamic(['185.99.255.28','155.94.150.39']);
let Domains = dynamic(['newnewnew.gotdns.org','soxnewwork.homedns.org','cdn007-digitaldownloads.com','sc.payproofkit.com','ns.mo7sen.dev']);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (IOCs) or RemoteUrl has_any (Domains)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S07 — ScreenConnect-associated Defender exclusion changes
Required telemetry: Defender for Endpoint process events
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('Add-MpPreference','Set-MpPreference','ExclusionPath','ExclusionProcess')
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has 'ScreenConnect' or ProcessCommandLine has_any ('RelayTrap','ScreenConnect')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S08 — Windows task/service creation fallback
Required telemetry: Windows Security Events; 7045 is commonly in System event logs and may not be present in SecurityEvent
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where EventID in (4698,7045)
| where RenderedDescription has_any ('TrapWatch','RelayTrap','ScreenConnect.ClientSetup')
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID, Account, RenderedDescription
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Detection Notes
Highest signal: SCKit filenames, RelayTrap path, TrapWatch task, RelayTrapLiteAlert registry entry and known rogue client identifiers. ScreenConnect and MSI installation alone are normal in managed environments. Device telemetry will not prove the console authentication bypass; ScreenConnect panel audit logs are required for that, and may not be ingested. Do not initiate ScreenConnect interactive sessions to potentially infected endpoints; use out-of-band response.