Threat Overview
Cynet’s November 11 report describes October 2026 attempted reverse-shell execution against Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows servers in several European organizations. The observed PowerShell command ran under scheduler.exe and attempted to reach 45.115.26.23:4455; follow-on Go backdoor communications used port 4456. The researchers also documented OpenSSH-based persistence and staged ActiveMQ/Veeam exploitation tools. Observed initial reverse-shell attempts were blocked and the specific initial Qlik vulnerability was not established.
References
https://thehackernews.com/2026/11/hackers-target-qlik-sense-servers-with.html (published November 11–13, 2026; see source)
Impacted Systems
Qlik Sense Enterprise for Windows self-managed servers, particularly Internet-reachable services. Historical CVE-2023-41265, CVE-2023-41266, CVE-2023-48365 affected older versions, but attribution of the 2026 attempts to a particular CVE or exact build is unconfirmed.
Why this matters
Analytics servers with access to enterprise data and internal infrastructure can become a foothold for remote shells, scheduled-task persistence and movement toward backup infrastructure.
Exploitation Status
Cynet reported blocked attack attempts, not confirmed successful compromise. The observed tools and infrastructure are threat-intelligence evidence; do not assume every connection on a related port is malicious.
What this hunt looks for
Behavioral endpoint, identity and network activity consistent with the described threat; no customer-specific results are claimed.
Required logs
DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceNetworkEvents, DeviceFileEvents, SecurityEvent and CommonSecurityLog where WAF/network records are ingested.
Q01 — Qlik scheduler spawning a shell
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ 'scheduler.exe'
| where FileName in~ ('powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','cmd.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe')
| project TimeGenerated,DeviceName,FileName,ProcessCommandLine,InitiatingProcessCommandLineQ02 — Reported attacker infrastructure
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP == '45.115.26.23' or RemotePort in (4455,4456,8012)
| project TimeGenerated,DeviceName,InitiatingProcessFileName,RemoteIP,RemotePort,ActionTypeQ03 — WinUpdCheck task or persistence script
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has 'WinUpdCheck' or ProcessCommandLine has 'winc.ps1'
| project TimeGenerated,DeviceName,FileName,ProcessCommandLineQ04 — OpenSSH installation or firewall changes
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ('install-sshd.ps1','OpenSSH-Win64.zip','New-NetFirewallRule','sshd')
| project TimeGenerated,DeviceName,FileName,ProcessCommandLineQ05 — Staged OpenSSH scripts
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ('winc.ps1','OpenSSH-Win64.zip') or FolderPath has 'ProgramData\\ssh'
| project TimeGenerated,DeviceName,FolderPath,FileName,ActionTypeQ06 — Scheduled-task security events
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d) and EventID in (4698,4702,4688)
| where EventData has 'WinUpdCheck' or CommandLine has 'winc.ps1'
| project TimeGenerated,Computer,EventID,Account,EventData,CommandLineQ07 — Qlik WAF and reported IP
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where DestinationIP == '45.115.26.23' or SourceIP == '45.115.26.23' or RequestURL has_any ('qlik','qrs')
| project TimeGenerated,SourceIP,DestinationIP,RequestURL,DeviceActionQ08 — New scheduler and PowerShell destinations
let baseline = DeviceNetworkEvents | where TimeGenerated between (ago(30d)..ago(2d)) | distinct DeviceName,RemoteIP;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(2d) and InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('scheduler.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe') and isnotempty(RemoteIP)
| join kind=leftanti baseline on DeviceName,RemoteIP
| summarize Hits=count() by DeviceName,RemoteIP,RemotePort,InitiatingProcessFileNameDetection Notes
Highest signal is scheduler.exe spawning PowerShell, the reported IP on the reported ports, and WinUpdCheck/winc.ps1 persistence. Port-only matches and Qlik scheduler activity require host and command-line context.
Queries have not been executed in customer Sentinel workspaces. Findings depend on ingested sources and retention; absence of matching telemetry does not establish absence of compromise.