2026-11-15 — Cursor Fireworks AI Incident and Claude Code Extension: Sentinel Hunts

Threat Overview

Cursor published a November 13, 2026 investigation update tracing its October 29 extension compromise to a vendor-issued Fireworks AI access key exposed at the vendor. The attacker copied historical non-Privacy-Mode coding-agent traces, some containing unredacted credentials, and accessed selected Cursor SaaS tools. A stolen credential was then used to insert malicious Anthropic.claude-code extension builds 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 into the Cursor marketplace cache for roughly 11 hours. The malicious build collected host metadata, attempted to append an SSH key labeled svc-telemetry and establish a persistent reverse SSH tunnel. Cursor says at most 5,000 users could have received affected builds, not that 5,000 systems were compromised. This report focuses on the newly confirmed causal chain and residual endpoint risk, not a newly occurring campaign.

References

Cursor incident update, November 13, 2026: https://cursor.com/blog/security-incident-update

Cursor original notice, October 29 (updated October 30), 2026: https://cursor.com/blog/claude-code-extension-security-notice

BleepingComputer, November 14, 2026: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/

Impacted Systems

Cursor editor VS Code extension marketplace; malicious cached Anthropic.claude-code extension versions 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 installed/updated on Windows or macOS between 02:27 and 13:35 Pacific, October 29, 2026. Official Anthropic distribution and Open VSX were not compromised according to Cursor; other Cursor extensions and Cursor application updates were not affected. Local SSH service enablement generally required admin privileges; other persistence attempts may still have succeeded. No OS build or CVE applies.

Why this matters

AI assistant traces and support records can contain production credentials. A compromised extension cache can create persistent access on developer workstations and expose cloud identities even after the extension is uninstalled.

Exploitation Status

Confirmed by Cursor. Cursor says it blocked the last observed attacker activity on November 1 and considers the incident contained. Successful remote login was limited by permission errors on most hosts; individual host compromise must not be inferred from install count.

What this hunt looks for

The following KQL hunts were prepared for execution against available Microsoft Sentinel telemetry, where the specified sources are ingested. No customer telemetry has yet been reviewed for this report.

Required logs

Windows/macOS Defender endpoint tables, SecurityEvent 4688 and Entra sign-ins only where ingested. File content inspection of authorized_keys is not available from standard DeviceFileEvents alone. No customer workspace was queried. Conclusions are limited to the sources and retention available in Microsoft Sentinel. Absence of matching activity does not establish absence of compromise on unmonitored systems or in non-ingested logs.

C01 — Reverse SSH tunnel command lines

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("ssh", "ssh.exe", "autossh")
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "-R" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "localhost:22" or ProcessCommandLine has "ExitOnForwardFailure")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

C02 — Cursor payload persistence command lines

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("svc-telemetry", "com.apple.sysmond", "smt.cmd", "smtk", "sysmon.cmd")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

C03 — Malicious persistence file artifacts

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("com.apple.sysmond.plist", "smt.cmd", "smtk", "sysmon.cmd", ".smt", ".smtk")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

C04 — SSH service enablement after editor execution

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("Add-WindowsCapability", "systemsetup -setremotelogin", "sshd")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("OpenSSH.Server", "-setremotelogin", "Start-Service", "sshd")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

C05 — Scheduled task SysMon creation

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("schtasks.exe", "powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has "SysMon" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/create", "Register-ScheduledTask")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

C06 — Extension version strings in process command lines

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains "anthropic.claude-code" and (ProcessCommandLine contains "2.1.312" or ProcessCommandLine contains "2.1.313")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

C07 — SecurityEvent 4688 reverse SSH fallback

SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where EventID == 4688
| where CommandLine contains "-R" and CommandLine contains "localhost:22"
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName

C08 — Rare successful Entra sign-in IPs after developer exposure

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ResultType == "0"
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Signins=count() by UserPrincipalName, IPAddress
| where Signins <= 2
| order by FirstSeen desc

Detection Notes

The svc-telemetry SSH key comment and persistence names are strong campaign indicators but the comment cannot be found in DeviceFileEvents without file-content collection. Windows SysMon task name alone is ambiguous. Look for combinations of reverse SSH flags, malicious task/LaunchAgent and extension version. macOS endpoint coverage may be missing even when Windows Defender is present. Do not mistake official Anthropic versions from other distribution channels for tampered cache builds.

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