2026-11-15 — GSocket Linux Relay Persistence: Sentinel Hunts

Threat Overview

Microsoft Security Research reported on November 11, 2026 that multiple threat actors installed the legitimate GSocket/gs-netcat tool following compromise of Internet-facing Linux applications. A curl-retrieved installer staged binaries in writable or memory-backed paths, sometimes renamed to service-like processes, and established outbound sessions through the public Global Socket Relay Network. Persistence through cron, systemd and shell startup mechanisms can survive remediation of the initial vulnerable application. The relay infrastructure and distribution domains are not necessarily attacker-controlled; GSocket usage alone is not malicious.

References

Microsoft Security Blog, November 11, 2026: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/11/11/global-socket-how-threat-actors-weaponizing-gsocket-stealthy-c2/

BleepingComputer, November 12, 2026: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/

Impacted Systems

Linux servers running Internet-facing PHP, Apache, Node or Java web applications and hosting panels; cloud VMs and on-prem/self-managed Linux servers. No single affected version, port or CVE defines this activity: attackers first exploit a separate application weakness or other initial access, then deploy GSocket. No vendor fixed version exists for legitimate GSocket itself. Egress to public relay infrastructure is required for remote operation.

Why this matters

Persistent relay access can outlive patching and avoids an attacker-owned C2 IP, increasing dwell time and reducing the effectiveness of simple network blocks.

Exploitation Status

Microsoft confirmed observations across multiple intrusions. Not every step, persistence method, or privilege escalation attempt was seen on every host.

What this hunt looks for

The following KQL hunts were prepared for execution against available Microsoft Sentinel telemetry, where the specified sources are ingested. No customer telemetry has yet been reviewed for this report.

Required logs

DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents and DeviceNetworkEvents require Defender for Endpoint Linux integration into Sentinel. Syslog is an incomplete fallback. No customer workspace was queried. Conclusions are limited to the sources and retention available in Microsoft Sentinel. Absence of matching activity does not establish absence of compromise on unmonitored systems or in non-ingested logs.

G01 — GSocket process names and command lines

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FileName has_any ("gs-netcat", "gsocket") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("gs-netcat", "gsocket.io", "gsgg.b-cdn.net")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

G02 — Web-service process launching shell/downloaders

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("apache2", "httpd", "nginx", "php-fpm", "php", "node", "java")
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "curl", "wget", "python", "python3")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

G03 — GSocket staging and masquerade artifacts

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where FolderPath startswith "/dev/shm/.gs-" or FileName in~ ("systemd-remount-d", ".gsn_ora", "defunct", "defunct.service")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName

G04 — Microsoft-observed GSocket SHA256s

let Hashes = dynamic(["d94f75a70b5cabaf786ac57177ed841732e62bdcc9a29e06e5b41d9be567bcfa", "f95c4d029e6784e3849b4d1e2e2ae1a661187236ef7c5d487c71158a290a03b5", "55d141bb2f62c527c3fea3413b8429fed7d52633d0b123b5e611bfa42165229f", "12450bafc7a4398040e1ad3a16dbf4dbc79b6a8f83ef306c4f0f73f59886f06c"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SHA256 in~ (Hashes)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, ActionType

G05 — GSocket installer distribution connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("gsocket.io", "gsgg.b-cdn.net")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

G06 — Suspicious systemd/cron modifications

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("crontab", "systemctl", "defunct.service", "multi-user.target.wants")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("defunct", ".gs-", "gs-netcat", "systemd-remount-d")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

G07 — Renamed payload execution and timestamp tampering

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("exec -a", "touch -r", "chmod 700")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("defunct", "systemd-remount-d", ".gs-")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName

G08 — Linux Syslog fallback for named artifacts

Syslog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SyslogMessage has_any ("gs-netcat", "gsocket.io", "gsgg.b-cdn.net", "systemd-remount-d", "defunct.service")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Facility, ProcessName, SyslogMessage

Detection Notes

Microsoft-published file hashes are campaign observations, not universal GSocket hashes. gsocket.io and distribution CDN domains are legitimate dual-use infrastructure. Prioritize process ancestry from web services, hidden staging, suspicious persistence and relay egress together. Syslog rarely captures full process command lines unless audit logging is enabled.

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