Threat Overview
Aikido Security documented a credential-driven GitHub supply-chain campaign beginning November 10, 2026. Stolen GitHub accounts created innocuous-looking pull requests to test write access, then injected CI scripts/workflows or npm install hooks to steal secrets from build environments. Aikido counted 4,837 compromised accounts probing 61,764 repositories, with evidence of execution in more than 1,800 repositories. These are researcher observations, not a count of confirmed customer breaches. Repository changes may be reverted rapidly and workflow logs deleted. No GitHub platform vulnerability was claimed.
References
Aikido Security, November 12, 2026: https://www.aikido.dev/blog
SecurityWeek, November 12, 2026: https://www.securityweek.com/attacker-targets-60000-github-repositories-in-credential-theft-campaign//
Impacted Systems
GitHub.com accounts and repositories with write/collaborator access; GitHub Actions runners and CI secrets; public and private repositories potentially reachable through stolen account permissions. No affected GitHub version/build: this is credential misuse, not a product CVE. Risk requires stolen credentials and permission to modify workflows, hooks, or executable repository content. Hosted and self-hosted runners can be exposed depending on workflow execution and secret access.
Why this matters
Compromised developer and CI identities can turn ordinary repository access into access to cloud, deployment and AI-provider credentials. The attack can cross organizational boundaries through collaborator privileges.
Exploitation Status
Confirmed active campaign by Aikido on November 10–12, 2026. Specific customer compromise not established.
What this hunt looks for
The following KQL hunts were prepared for execution against available Microsoft Sentinel telemetry, where the specified sources are ingested. No customer telemetry has yet been reviewed for this report.
Required logs
GitHub audit events require an ingested GitHub audit source; standard OfficeActivity, AzureActivity and Entra logs do not provide GitHub pull-request history. Sentinel can see subsequent Azure/Entra/AWS credential use, endpoint runner execution and egress only where these feeds are ingested. No customer workspace was queried. Conclusions are limited to the sources and retention available in Microsoft Sentinel. Absence of matching activity does not establish absence of compromise on unmonitored systems or in non-ingested logs.
W03 — CI runner shell invoking hidden .ci script
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine contains ".ci-" and ProcessCommandLine has ".sh"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
W04 — Runner command lines accessing secret material
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (".aws/credentials", ".azure", ".npmrc", ".env")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "node", "npm", "python", "python3")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
W05 — Runner shell and outbound network correlation
let Shells = DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "curl", "wget")
| project DeviceId, ProcessId, ShellTime=TimeGenerated, ShellCmd=ProcessCommandLine;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where isnotempty(RemoteIP)
| join kind=inner Shells on DeviceId
| where TimeGenerated between (ShellTime .. ShellTime + 5m)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceId, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, InitiatingProcessFileName, ShellCmd
W06 — New Azure service principal sign-in IPs
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where ResultType == "0"
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Events=count() by ServicePrincipalId, ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress
| where Events <= 3
| order by FirstSeen desc
W07 — AWS credential and access-key changes
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where EventName in~ ("CreateAccessKey", "UpdateAccessKey", "PutUserPolicy", "AttachUserPolicy", "AssumeRole")
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, SourceIpAddress, UserIdentityArn, RequestParameters
| order by TimeGenerated desc
W08 — Suspicious runner download-and-execute command
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where FileName in~ ("bash", "sh", "curl", "wget", "node", "npm")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("curl", "wget") and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("bash", "sh", "node")
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
Detection Notes
GitHub PR titles, workflow changes and branch metadata are the strongest campaign evidence, but no GitHub audit table is confirmed in the customer inventories. The included queries therefore cover only indirect endpoint, Azure identity and AWS activity where ingested; these cannot prove wfx-loot attribution. GitHub-hosted runner process events are not automatically collected in Sentinel. Correlate anomalies with repository audit records outside this package if separately available.