2026-11-16 — FBI ARTEX Flash: Cloud and Identity Intrusion Hunts

Threat Overview

The FBI released FLASH-20261113-001 on November 13 documenting multiple malicious actors using the ARTEX agentic penetration-testing framework in real intrusions since August. The alert describes automated web reconnaissance, exploitation, stolen service-principal and partner credentials, Azure and AWS permission probing, web shells, OAuth credential additions, lateral movement and exfiltration. This is a newly published official consolidation of ongoing ARTEX campaigns, not a new vulnerability and not a new unrelated campaign.

References

FBI FLASH-20261113-001, 13 November 2026: https://www.ic3.gov/CSA/2026/261113.pdf

BleepingComputer, 15 November 2026: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/

Impacted Systems

Organizations with internet-exposed enterprise apps, cloud infrastructure, Microsoft Entra/Microsoft 365, AWS, partner federation, remote administration and CI/CD. No specific vulnerable product versions; ARTEX is attacker tooling, not a vendor vulnerability. Exploitation depends on vulnerable apps, misconfigurations, stolen credentials or trust relationships.

Why this matters

FBI corroborates observed multi-sector attacks and compressed intrusion timelines; MSSPs can detect behavior across cloud identity, web and endpoints.

Exploitation Status

FBI confirms malicious use in global campaigns since August 2026. The IPs in the advisory are historical and may be reassigned. FBI alert is November 13; underlying incidents are older.

What this hunt looks for

The following queries are prepared for execution against relevant Microsoft Sentinel tables where the data sources are ingested. No telemetry was reviewed in this report run. Required data classes: AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs, AWSCloudTrail, AuditLogs, AzureActivity, AzureDiagnostics, CommonSecurityLog, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, SigninLogs.

Required logs

Conclusions are limited to data sources and retention actually available in Microsoft Sentinel. Absence of matching activity does not confirm absence of activity on unmonitored systems or in non-ingested logs. No customer workspace was queried.

Hunts

A01 — FBI-documented ARTEX-associated IPs in Entra sign-ins

Required table: `SigninLogs`. FBI historical indicators; VPN/cloud IP reuse possible.

let IOCs=dynamic(['144.172.64.60','144.172.64.99','144.172.64.128','187.15.88.186','187.15.90.217','187.15.89.186','199.19.95.166','199.19.95.67','199.19.95.68','91.92.240.238','85.11.168.45','178.16.54.129','31.77.229.135','85.11.167.152']);
SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where IPAddress in (IOCs)
| project TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, IPAddress, AppDisplayName, ResultType, ConditionalAccessStatus, LocationDetails
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A02 — Unusual service-principal sign-in origins

Required table: `AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs`. Baseline IPs across longer retention before labeling new; table requires service-principal logs.

AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where isnotempty(IPAddress)
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated), Events=count(), Apps=make_set(ResourceDisplayName,8) by ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress
| where Events >= 3
| order by Events desc

A03 — New app credentials and consent changes

Required table: `AuditLogs`. OperationName differs by Entra event version; review actual values.

AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where OperationName has_any ('Add service principal credentials','Add application password','Add application key','Consent to application','Add app role assignment')
| project TimeGenerated, OperationName, Result, InitiatedBy, TargetResources, CorrelationId
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A04 — Azure role or deployment changes

Required table: `AzureActivity`. Not ARTEX-specific; correlates with FBI-described cloud enumeration and provisioning.

AzureActivity
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where OperationNameValue has_any ('roleAssignments/write','deployments/validate/action','deployments/write','publicIPAddresses/write')
| project TimeGenerated, Caller, OperationNameValue, ActivityStatusValue, ResourceGroup, ResourceId, CallerIpAddress
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A05 — AWS IAM probing and role trust manipulation

Required table: `AWSCloudTrail`. Some actions are not logged as API events (e.g. PassRole is permission); interpret as coverage of logged events only.

AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where EventName in~ ('SimulatePrincipalPolicy','GetCallerIdentity','AssumeRole','PassRole','UpdateAssumeRolePolicy','CreateAccessKey','AttachRolePolicy','RunInstances')
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, EventSource, UserIdentityArn, SourceIpAddress, ErrorCode, RequestParameters
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A06 — Rapid API enumeration against a public web service

Required table: `AzureDiagnostics`. Only Azure Application Gateway access logs with this schema; not generic Azure WAF.

AzureDiagnostics
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where Category has 'ApplicationGatewayAccessLog'
| extend ClientIP=tostring(column_ifexists('clientIP_s','')), Uri=tostring(column_ifexists('requestUri_s',''))
| where isnotempty(ClientIP)
| summarize Requests=count(), DistinctPaths=dcount(Uri), SamplePaths=make_set(Uri,8) by ClientIP, bin(TimeGenerated,5m)
| where Requests > 200 and DistinctPaths > 30
| order by Requests desc

A07 — Web-service child shell or download tools

Required table: `DeviceProcessEvents`. Requires EDR; server child processes can be administrative or app maintenance.

DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('w3wp.exe','httpd.exe','apache2','nginx','php-fpm','java')
| where FileName in~ ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','bash','sh','curl','wget','python','python3')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A08 — Suspicious web-shell file changes

Required table: `DeviceFileEvents`. Application deployment creates benign files; correlate with web shell execution.

DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where FileName endswith '.aspx' or FileName endswith '.jsp' or FileName endswith '.php'
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('w3wp.exe','httpd.exe','apache2','nginx','php-fpm','java')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc

A09 — FBI IOC egress in firewall logs

Required table: `CommonSecurityLog`. Historical IOC matching; not proof of active ARTEX infrastructure.

let IOCs=dynamic(['38.244.50.120','199.19.95.166','199.19.95.67','199.19.95.68','85.11.167.152']);
CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where SourceIP in (IOCs) or DestinationIP in (IOCs)
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationPort, DeviceAction, Activity
| order by TimeGenerated desc

Detection Notes

Highest signal: unusual service-principal source IP coupled with app credential modification or Azure role change, or web process spawning a shell. Cloud APIs and LLM domains have legitimate uses. AzureDiagnostics schema and audit operation names vary; adapt to deployed connectors. FBI IPs are historical; do not block solely on a match. Missing web/endpoint/cloud data means many phases are invisible.

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