Threat Overview
Security researcher Abdelhamid Naceri disclosed a proof of concept called SignDrop that abuses CLFS authentication-file creation when a privileged process opens a log file. The researcher claims it can cause a .cnpf file to be created in a privileged context and facilitate SYSTEM privilege escalation and security-product tampering. These are researcher claims backed by public demonstrations, not independently confirmed exploitation in victim networks.
References
BleepingComputer, 12 November 2026: https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/new-windows-signdrop-zero-day-gives-hackers-system-privileges/
Impacted Systems
Microsoft Windows CLFS authentication mitigation, local Windows endpoint/server installations with relevant CLFS Authentication Mode. Researcher tested Windows 11 26H2, Windows 11 26H2 Experimental and Windows Server 2025 Experimental. Full affected build matrix, official CVE and fixed builds are not confirmed. Local code execution/ability to induce privileged log-file open is a prerequisite; not unauthenticated remote exploitation.
Why this matters
Potential escalation from local access to SYSTEM and security-tool interference on Windows endpoints; useful post-compromise hunt.
Exploitation Status
Researcher-released proof of concept; no verified exploitation in the wild. No confirmed vendor patch at reporting time.
What this hunt looks for
The following queries are prepared for execution against relevant Microsoft Sentinel tables where the data sources are ingested. No telemetry was reviewed in this report run. Required data classes: DeviceEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceRegistryEvents, SecurityEvent.
Required logs
Conclusions are limited to data sources and retention actually available in Microsoft Sentinel. Absence of matching activity does not confirm absence of activity on unmonitored systems or in non-ingested logs. No customer workspace was queried.
Hunts
S01 — CLFS authentication file creation
Required table: `DeviceFileEvents`. CNPF files are legitimate CLFS mitigation artifacts; context matters.
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where FileName endswith '.cnpf'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, FolderPath, FileName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S02 — Security process creates CLFS authentication files
Required table: `DeviceFileEvents`. Initiator attribution may reflect system service and not exploit intent.
DeviceFileEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where FileName endswith '.cnpf'
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ('MsMpEng.exe','SenseIR.exe','MsSense.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
S03 — Unexpected SYSTEM command interpreters
Required table: `DeviceProcessEvents`. Broad follow-up: not SignDrop-specific.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where AccountName =~ 'system' or AccountSid == 'S-1-5-18'
| where FileName in~ ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe','wscript.exe','cscript.exe')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, AccountName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S04 — Defender tampering and protection changes
Required table: `DeviceEvents`. ActionType values vary by sensor and Defender feature.
DeviceEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where ActionType has_any ('Tamper','Antivirus','Defender','Protection')
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, AdditionalFields, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S05 — CLFS registry mode modifications
Required table: `DeviceRegistryEvents`. Registry mode indicates configuration, not successful exploitation.
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(30d)
| where RegistryKey contains @'\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CLFS\Authentication'
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, ActionType, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
S06 — Windows 4688 process creation fallback
Required table: `SecurityEvent`. 4688 command-line logging may be disabled; SYSTEM shells have legitimate uses.
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d) and EventID == 4688
| where NewProcessName has_any ('cmd.exe','powershell.exe','pwsh.exe')
| where SubjectUserSid == 'S-1-5-18'
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, SubjectUserName, NewProcessName, CommandLine, ParentProcessName
| order by TimeGenerated desc
S07 — New service or scheduled task after suspected escalation
Required table: `SecurityEvent`. Post-exploitation behavioral follow-up; no unique SignDrop service or task names are known.
SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(14d)
| where EventID in (4697,4698,4702)
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, EventID, Activity, Account, EventData
| order by TimeGenerated desc
Detection Notes
Highest signal: anomalous .cnpf creation plus nearby unexpected SYSTEM process and tamper event. .cnpf itself is normal CLFS artifact; process and registry telemetry may not capture the kernel operation. No reliable exploit-specific hash or attacker IP published. Do not run untrusted PoC on production systems.