2026-11-17 — Optimizely Web Experimentation malicious third-party JavaScript

Threat Overview

On 16 November, attackers inserted malicious code into the Project JavaScript setting of Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects. Report URI identified 188 infected scripts belonging to 178 organizations, delivered from the legitimate Optimizely CDN. Payloads attempted payment-card skimming, cryptocurrency-address replacement, theft of accessible cookies and screenshots, and delivery of iOS exploit kits. Optimizely acknowledged exploitation of a vulnerability in its Experimentation service and said it removed injected code and fixed the flaw. The full impact and successful iOS compromise count remain unconfirmed.

References

Report URI, Scott Helme, 16 Nov 2026: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/

Help Net Security, 17 Nov 2026: https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2026/11/17/optimizely-vulnerability-malicious-javascript/

Reuters, 17 Nov 2026: https://www.reuters.com/legal/government/popular-websites-subverted-bid-steal-crypto-target-iphone-users-2026-11-17/

Impacted Systems

Optimizely Web Experimentation, SaaS-hosted client-side JavaScript snippets; websites embedding affected Optimizely project snippets and their visitors. This is not a demonstrated vulnerability in each customer website server. No vulnerable product version or CVE has been publicly confirmed. Optimizely reports the service flaw fixed and affected injected code removed.

Why this matters

Third-party scripts execute in trusted browser contexts; a compromised vendor-managed script can affect customer websites without any compromise of customer servers.

Exploitation Status

Confirmed malicious JavaScript delivery on 16 November; Optimizely acknowledged an exploited service vulnerability. Researcher observed wallet transactions but not a verified count of compromised visitors or iOS devices.

What this hunt looks for

Layered, telemetry-dependent searches for exploit or credential-abuse behavior, followed by source-IP, network, process, identity and persistence pivots. These queries have not been executed in a customer workspace.

Required logs

DeviceNetworkEvents, CommonSecurityLog, SigninLogs. Only hunts whose tables are ingested into Microsoft Sentinel are applicable.

O01 — Reported exfiltration destination in endpoint connections

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-16)
| where RemoteUrl has "1688360.cc"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort

O02 — Reported destination in network-security telemetry

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-16)
| where DestinationHostName has "1688360.cc" or RequestURL has "1688360.cc"
| project TimeGenerated, DeviceVendor, DeviceProduct, SourceIP, DestinationIP, DestinationHostName, RequestURL, DeviceAction

O03 — Browsers contacting newly rare domains

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated >= ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","safari")
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| summarize Devices=dcount(DeviceId), Hits=count(), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by RemoteUrl
| where Devices <= 2 and Hits >= 3
| order by LastSeen desc

O04 — Optimizely CDN visibility in network telemetry

DeviceNetworkEvents
| where TimeGenerated between (datetime(2026-11-16)..datetime(2026-11-18))
| where RemoteUrl has "optimizely.com"
| summarize Hits=count(), Devices=dcount(DeviceId), FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), LastSeen=max(TimeGenerated) by RemoteUrl
| order by Hits desc

O05 — Web-proxy requests for Optimizely and reported destination

CommonSecurityLog
| where TimeGenerated between (datetime(2026-11-16)..datetime(2026-11-18))
| where RequestURL has_any ("optimizely.com","1688360.cc") or DestinationHostName has_any ("optimizely.com","1688360.cc")
| summarize Requests=count(), Sources=dcount(SourceIP) by DestinationHostName, DeviceAction
| order by Requests desc

O06 — Suspicious new sign-ins following incident window

SigninLogs
| where TimeGenerated >= datetime(2026-11-16)
| where ResultType == "0"
| summarize FirstSeen=min(TimeGenerated), IPs=dcount(IPAddress), Countries=make_set(Location,10), Apps=make_set(AppDisplayName,10) by UserPrincipalName
| where IPs >= 4
| order by IPs desc

Detection Notes

Highest signal is a matching exfiltration destination in proxy/endpoint network telemetry during the incident window. Optimizely CDN access alone is normal and not evidence of compromise. Browser cookies, card-field reads, and script content are not recorded in ordinary Sentinel sign-in logs; CSP violation or web-proxy content telemetry must be separately ingested.

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